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Traditional Faiths in Ukraine and Missionary Activity
by Anatoly Kolodniy
Anatoly Kolodniy, who was one of the organizers of the Ukrainian
section of the Emory University proselytism study project, is head of
the Ukrainian Association of Researchers of Religion. He recently
established the Center for Religious Information and Freedom
(CERIF)and teaches at Mohyla University in Kyiv.
Religious tradition, traditional religion, traditional church: these concepts
engage not only denominational theologians in Ukraine, but also activists in the
democratic movement who strive to capitalize on certain traditional religious entities
as spiritual foundations for the process of national rebirth.
Let us begin by defining the phenomenon of tradition itself. Tradition serves
as one form of socio-cultural transmission, which lends to the preservation of culture
and its reproduction and development. The functional nature of tradition is evident in
its socializing of new generations. Tradition guarantees the stabilization of social
relations and cohesion.
The following properties characterize tradition: formation of a collective
character; a high level of constancy; and a codification of the life experience of
human groups. Tradition consolidates the peoples of a nation. Tradition reproduces
the thoughts of the past in the actual experience of the present.
Understanding the role of tradition in religious organizations and movements
is complex. Some approach the concept of religious tradition from a chronological
perspective. This approach views as traditional those groups who have been around a
long time. A strict chronological approach would recognize the tradition of paganism,
for example. Correspondingly, numerous Christian denominations would necessarily
qualify as ‘secondary’ traditions.
However, no one has fixed the number of years or centuries a denomination
needs to exist to call itself ‘traditional.’ The Baptist movement in Ukraine dates from
1854. That is almost eight centuries less than Orthodoxy, yet it too is a traditional
denomination of Ukraine. Ukraine has experienced over a thousand years of Islam,
yet it would not be considered a ‘traditional’ religion of our people. The fact that

every religious system is a historical event militates against attempting to understand
traditions merely as a reflection of chronology or geography.
Each religious system has sequential stages: a period of youth, when it
emerged and grew; a period when extant denominations opposed it; a period of
establishment; and a period of development where it blossoms on territories it did not
originate. Such was the case with Christianity. Since the day of its birth it experienced
persecution from Jewish synagogues and from the authorities of the Roman Empire.
To a certain extent, Orthodoxy was fortunate in Ukraine-Rus in that it was Rus’
princes who supported its establishment in the tenth through the twelfth centuries.
Because Christianity did not provide Ukraine’s ancestors with an understanding of
contemporary life, the surrounding natural environment, and agriculture, they
continued to comprehend these phenomena through pagan traditions. Christianity and
ancient beliefs together coalesced in the consciousness of Ukraine. Ancestral cults
were preserved, as were belief in house-gnomes, forest-gnomes, and water-gnomes.
The cult of traditional deities was only reluctantly supplanted by Christian patron
saints that functioned similarly. This history shaped the traits of Ukrainian religiosity:
openness, syncretism, and tolerance. The religion of the masses can be termed as
“popular Christianity.”
All this encourages us to understand religious tradition from other than a
chronological approach. Religious tradition evolves as a manifestation of the religious
elements within an integrated system of a people’s culture. These elements are
organically inter-twined with the group’s spirituality. They express the given
spirituality by comparison with that of other peoples. Inasmuch as national culture is
dynamic, its religious element should also be expected to be in a state of flux and
changing paradigms. In the Ukrainian heritage, traditional faiths are those whose
systems of rituals and creeds are a unique product of national culture. Such is the
Ukrainian Christian rite, which took shape during the first seven centuries of
Christianity’s growth in Ukraine. It is the common heritage of both Ukrainian
Orthodoxy and Ukrainian Catholicism (a.k.a. Greek Catholicism, or the Uniate rite).
This helps us to understand why, during the period of nation-building, the
Ukrainian state and national-democratic movements have, to an extent, defended the

confessional space of traditional Ukrainian churches from foreign missionaries. This
reveals the desire for the rebirth of an entire national culture with each of its
components intact. Only by adopting a perspective that includes the integrated
context of religion’s history on Ukrainian soil can one comprehend the current
religious situation in Ukraine, interdenominational relations, and attitudes towards
missionary activity.

A Complex Denominational History
The denominational history of Ukraine is complex. This complexity is
determined by Ukraine’s location on the border between East and West, at the locus
of contact between two world religions—Christianity and Islam—and between two
major Christian Churches: Orthodoxy and Catholicism.
The religious map of Ukraine has never been mono-confessional. Even in
ancient Ukraine-Rus, there were local gods who were revered by separate tribes in
addition to the gods whom the whole eastern Slavic world worshipped. By installing
Christianity as the State religion in 988, Prince Volodimir further complicated the
map of religious life. He had hoped that this act should overcome a plurality of
denominations. For the duration of about three centuries, the lower levels of the
population (villages especially) remained pagan. But the upper tiers of society rapidly
Christianized. In time, Ukrainians conducted their own unification of the religious
world by combining paganism and Christianity into a hybrid belief system. This
syncretic form of Christianized paganism describes the religion of most Ukrainians
practically to this day. Ukrainians rarely recognize this when they claim to belong to
traditional historical Christian denominations.
Constant partitioning and seizing of territory by hostile neighbor states
(Russia, Poland, and Turkey) and active missionary activity by the Catholic Church
and Protestant movements from Europe introduced new changes in the religious
configuration of Ukraine. Poles brought Catholicism to Ukraine (mostly to the
western regions of Galicia, Volin, and Podilia), and German colonists brought various
forms of Protestantism, particularly the Lutheran, Baptist, and Seventh-day Adventist
creeds, to the southern regions.

Judaism came from Western Europe when the Jews migrated to Ukraine. The
Hassidic denomination emerged in Ukraine, where to this day, many Hassidic shrines
attract pilgrims. Islamic congregations appeared on Ukrainian lands from the days of
the Tartar conquests. However, Islam found almost no followers among the core of
the ethnos. Those in Ukraine of this faith are usually emigrants from traditionally
Islamic countries.
Crimea has long had a striped religious makeup. Ancient Greeks introduced
Christianity to the region, and the Tartars added Islam in the 13th century. Native
Crimeans and the Karaims had their own autonomous sect there.
The Greek-Catholic Church is the most influential of Ukraine’s national
churches. Its creation in 1596 is often framed as a consequence of strictly external
forces, namely, the efforts of the Polish authorities and the Jesuits to Catholicize and
Policize Ukrainians. However, it was the objective, internal factors that caused the
union of Catholicism and Orthodoxy to produce the Uniate Church. Among these
factors were (1) the precarious state of the Orthodox Church in the 16th century, and
(2) the formation of national churches as an aspect of the cultural-historical process of
the

Renaissance
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Reformation

Age.

In

time,

the

development

of

Greek-Catholicism as the national religion of Ukraine became their guarantee of
national self-preservation. On the one hand, Greek-Catholicism, blocked the Poles
from Latinizing Ukrainian Christianity, and on the other hand, it prevented the
complete Russification of Ukrainians in the palm of Moscow’s Orthodoxy.
Protestantism could have played a significant role in identifying Ukraine’s
national heritage, but the Ukrainian movement of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries did not take a reformist course, as it was intent on creating a national
church. It feared breaking with church tradition and the opinion that Orthodoxy was
the only possible national institution. Protestant movements that appeared at this time
in Ukraine, particularly the Socinians, Anti-Trinitarians, and Reformists, quickly lost
influence. The Adventist, Baptist, and other movements of late Protestantism,
disseminated in Ukraine in the nineteenth century, did not become national religious
options for several reasons: (1) the denominational religious rituals, which most
express ethnic traits, were overly simplified; (2) their ideologues over-emphasized the

supranational character of Christianity and subordinated national living to the
religious; and (3) their missionary activities were designed to join representatives of
various ethnic groups to the faith. Surely for these reasons, not a single Protestant
denomination acted as an agent of ethnic creation or integration in Ukraine.
Moreover, the liquidation of Ukrainian Orthodoxy’s original, national attributes by
the Moscow Patriarchate after its takeover of the Kyivan metropolitan in 1686,
created fertile soil for the unfolding of the Christian sectarian movement. The
multiplicity

of

sects

facilitated

the

national

disintegration

and

spiritual

disorganization of Ukrainians. The Orthodox faith was deprived of its nation-building
characteristics, and Ukraine was deprived of its own national church organizations.
The tolerance of Orthodox Ukrainians towards other religions enabled driven,
persecuted believers of various faiths to find refuge from neighboring countries, (e.g.,
Russia), in Ukrainian lands. Thus we encounter various strands of Old Believers
(Orthodoxy’s reactionaries), dukhobory, and molokansy. The 1920s and 1930s
produced its own peculiar boom of denominational differentiation in Ukraine as well
as in the entire Soviet Union to which it belonged for 70 years. During this period, the
Johnites, Fedorivites, True Orthodoxy, Apocalyptics, JehovahIlyinites, pidhorntsy,
and other groups were offshoots of Orthodoxy. In the first half of this century, a range
of keno-systematic sects appear in Ukraine, including the following: inokentivtsy (in
the

Odessa

region),

leontivtsy

(Volyn),

malovantsy

(Kyiv),

mitrofanivtsy

(Kirovohrad), and myrashkivtsy (Polisia). Particular to their faith is the belief in ‘the
living God,’ whose name is pronounced in the name of the denomination.
Because the Ukrainian people did not have their own political state since the
thirteenth century, (a fundamental trait of national consolidation), and its ethnic
territory was continually partitioned among neighboring colonizing states, no single
faith became the national religion. Orthodoxy and Greek-Catholicism competed to be
the sole religious expression of the country, and they both yearn to subordinate all
believers in Ukraine. But this leads only to inter-denominational conflicts that have
not ceased to this day.
Since the time of Ukraine’s state independence (1991), its denominational
situation has become even more complicated. Traditional Ukrainian churches, such as

the Greek-Catholic and Autocephalous Orthodox (which later became the Kyiv
Patriarchate), experienced a revival in their social and religious lives. The national
rebirth movement spawned movements with a pagan basis, such as Native Faith,
Native Ukrainian National Faith, Great Fire, and others. They all jockey their claims
to represent the ‘well-spring of Ukrainian religious spirituality.’ In this context, the
Orthodox Church’s Moscow Patriarchate, to which the majority of Ukraine’s parishes
belong and which has a three-century history on its territory, is viewed by
national-democratic forces as a foreign imposition. It is suspected of intending to
restore the former Russian empire and of indifference to Ukraine’s national interests.
Roman Catholicism’s growing inroads into Ukraine, through which has gushed a
torrent of Polish priests and monks, has also drawn public criticism. It is typical that
this negativity is voiced not only by the Orthodox, but also by the Greek-Catholics.
The latter are dissatisfied by the Vatican’s chronic disregard of Ukraine’s national
needs, going so far as to coordinate its missionary work in Ukraine with the Moscow
Patriarchy.

No State Church
The historical sketch above leads us to the following conclusions:
1) Though the Moscow Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church has a lengthy history of
operations on Ukrainian soil, it is not a Ukrainian national church. It serves as an
agent of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) to organize its missionary activity in
Ukraine. Attempts to establish and fortify its existence in Ukraine constitute an effort
to return Ukraine to the Russian empire. This is what so provokes the displeasure of
national democratic forces. This was precisely the cause of the schism in Orthodoxy
in Ukraine. One must distinguish between traditional Ukrainian churches and
traditional churches in Ukraine, which describes exactly the Moscow Patriarchate.
2) The Kyivan Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church, like the Autocephalous Orthodox
Church, has its own seven-century tradition. This history spans from the days of the
baptism of Rus-Ukraine by Volodimir to 1686, when the Muscovite Church
subjugated the Kyivan metropolitan. Attempts to revive the Autocephalous Church in
the 1930s and 1940s failed. Therefore, the rebirth of Ukrainian Orthodox churches

today, precisely for reasons of self-establishment, strive to restrict various forms of
missionary activity, from both the Moscow Church and the Apostolic capital.
3) Using a name with reference to the native ethnos operating on Ukrainian territory,
or having a relatively long history in Ukraine does not a national church make. If a
church ignores the national language in its activity, is subject to a foreign
headquarters which disregards Ukrainian national interests, or even works against
Ukrainian sovereignty, it cannot be a Ukrainian national church. This is so even if a
major portion of its parishioners belongs to the Ukrainian ethnos. Furthermore, a
national church has its operational center within the borders of its own jurisdiction.
4) This definition of traditional national religious organizations leaves only the Kyiv
Patriarchate, the Orthodox Autocephalous, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic, and the
pagan groups. In our day, however, certain Protestant churches, including the Church
of Evangelical Christian-Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, and Christians of
Evangelical Faith, have demonstrated, to some extent, a national orientation.
The existence of new religious movements in Ukraine is a complex problem.
But even here there are definite shifts. The Community of Krishna Consciousness has
begun to conduct their religious services in the Ukrainian language, to use Ukrainian
melodies, and to translate their sacred books into Ukrainian. Moreover, theologians of
the Community of Krishna Consciousness seek the roots of their tradition deep in
Ukraine’s history, back in the times of its Tripiltsi culture. Undertaking various
charitable programs like “Food for the Sake of Life,” the Community strives to help
the young Ukrainian state to resolve its difficult social problems.
Recently, certain churches have sought the status of ‘state church,’
proclaiming themselves to be the sole national religious institution. However, the
concept of national church is not synonymous with the concept of a state church. The
first is a component in the spiritual-cultural cultivation of a nation, while the second
is an element of the sociopolitical process. For this, it is not obligatory to have an
entire history in the context of autonomous-national development or to be one’s own
system of creeds and rituals. While there may be multiple national churches or
movements in one country, there is usually only one state church institution in a
country at any given time.

As a result of its complex history and religious pluralism, Ukraine cannot and
does not have a state church. To a certain extent, one can justify and understand the
claim of the Kyivan Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. It truly is a
national church with a long tradition. Lengthy colonial dependence upon the Russian
Church has minimized its ability to conduct missionary activity and to defend itself in
opposition to other religious movements. Thus, a certain level of state support for the
establishment of this church would seem an entirely normal phenomenon. At the
same time, silent support from various levels of several state institutions for the
Orthodox Church’s Moscow Patriarchate clearly contradicts the country’s process of
gaining sovereignty and evokes the dissatisfaction of the national-democratic forces.
In his time, the Greek-Catholic Metropolitan Andrey Sheptitsky observed that
the division of Ukrainians along denominational lines “will lead the nation to total
ruin, if the representatives of the Ukrainian churches do not find a way to unite.”1
However, this condemnation of multi-denominationalism is somewhat extreme. By
itself, the religious factor in Ukraine was never a force for ethnic creation or
integration. It did play a significant role as an agent of national revival, however. Its
priority was always an allegiance to the national idea. Because Ukraine is
multi-denominational, national unity can be achieved only by commitment to the
principles of tolerance in inter-denominational relations and pluralism in one’s views
of religion and the world. Christian denominations that wish to aid national rebirth
should not aspire to monopolize influence in the spiritual life of Ukrainians. Rather,
for national reasons, they should put off the present differences among them. Only
convergence upon the level of the national idea as the first priority guarantees that
denominational differences will be viewed as something transitional or secondary to
the social and religious processes at work.

Crisis Within Historical Orthodoxy
Historical Orthodoxy is experiencing an acute crisis in Ukraine today. This
crisis is expressed not merely by Orthodoxy’s division into four hostile churches but
also by (1) its considerable loss of influence in the spiritual life of the individual and
1
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of the Ukrainian ethnos generally, (2) an absence of a deep and abiding faith among
most Orthodox members, despite the increase of external and ritualistic
demonstrations of religiosity, and (3) an absence of moral imperatives in the everyday
life and religion of the Orthodox believer.
There have been a number of contributors to this crisis:
(1) The rigid conservatism of Orthodoxy itself as a Christian denomination. A certain
fixation with the performance of bare ritual alienates the educated believer who
wishes to know religion and not just see it symbolized in a worship service.
(2) Orthodoxy’s lengthy existence as the state church under tsarist Russia, when all
people were forced to attend the churches, followed by severe restrictions imposed by
Soviet power which confined a priest to activity only within church walls. This
engendered indifference among the clergy toward missionary work. This conditioning
has led to the missionary helplessness of the Orthodox Church relative to other
Christian church’s missions and to its consequent reliance on the state for protection
of its so-called ‘canonical space.’
3) The Orthodox Church always lived at the expense of the sacrifices that its believers
could make. Today’s financial crisis and the increasing impoverishment of the
population have depleted the income to church coffers. Orthodox Churches do not
have proper funds for training its ministry, publishing literature, periodicals, or access
to mass media, or for organizing missionary endeavors.
4) Historical Orthodoxy does not have a tradition of humanitarian work or the value
for paying individual attention to its believers. In the modern environment of societal
fragmentation, each person seeks outside comfort, life-sustaining advice, and material
assistance on his/her own. A definite indifference by the traditional churches to the
needs and interests of the individual repels people and drives them to other
denominations, often to those that have been introduced by foreign missionaries.
Based on the principles of “One Lord, one faith,” (Ephesians 4:5) and “One
flock and one shepherd,” (John 10:16), Orthodox ideologues in Ukraine today stress
their role as ‘the true path to salvation.’ They contend that their denomination is not
merely one of many faiths but assert its exclusivity, as though history itself has
prepared and approved its exceptional status. Orthodoxy, they note, is “a church made

unique by its own truth.” When considered merely as one of many faiths, its universal
power and glory is not so convincing. Therefore, Orthodox theorists attempt not so
much to contradict other denominations as to discover in them manifestations of
Orthodoxy’s own universal spirit as a means to ‘Orthodoxize’ them. In their opinions,
this basis of thought and action can reverse sectarian individuation from Orthodoxy
and obstruct in a novel way the missionary activity of outside movements.
In the opinion of these Orthodox theoreticians, the presence of any ‘seeds of
Orthodoxy’ assures the convergence of the non-Orthodox Christian churches towards
‘true Christianity.’ In various ways, they propose only their ‘reeducation into
Orthodoxy.’ They do not raise the issue of organizationally appending or absorbing
these non-Orthodox religious institutions into some global Orthodox association. This
is because universal Orthodoxy is a confederation of independent church structures
and not a church empire with a single head, such as Catholicism, for example.
One True Church in Orthodox Publications
Orthodox publications in Ukraine particularly emphasize the refutation of
those arguments asserted by various denominations in order to ground the legitimacy
of their existence in the constellation of Christian groups. In God’s plan, they
underscore, one Church was built, not several. (“I will build my Church”—Matthew
16:18.) Thus there can be only one true Christian faith, and not one hundred or even
one thousand of them. According to Orthodox ideologues, this one church, founded
by Jesus Christ and full of God’s truth, is the Orthodox Church. Other churches,
because they emerged after this divine act of creation, are human products and thus
not ‘churches’ at all.2 In a series of brochures, “The Church and churches,” the
Moscow Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church sets forth this very position,
that this single church is Orthodoxy. They conclude, then, that the rest of the
Christian movements—Catholic, Baptist, Adventist, Mormon, Jehovah’s Witness,
and others—have no right to call themselves ‘churches.’ These publications refer to
them as “churches” in quotes.
The Orthodox go so far as to reserve for themselves not only the right to the
title of ‘church’ but also to the status of ‘religion.’ Proclaiming other faiths
2
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pseudo-religious, they ascribe to them immorality, neglect of individual interests, and
outright criminal behavior. They accuse missionaries of “zombification of their
‘sacrifices,” of using mental pressure, manipulation of consciousness under the guise
of performing rites, concealment of the true content of their denomination’s creed,
and other horrible things.
It is well known that Orthodox believers traditionally express their devotion
and religiosity through observing rituals. The ideologues of Orthodoxy seek to avert
its followers from competing teachings, missions, and neo-religious influences by
promoting the unsophisticated fixation that these groups lack “a liturgy in the true
sense of the word,” “the saving power of the rites,” “the recognition of Orthodox
cathedrals,” etc. In addition, they persistently pursue the point that a church service
must be performed exclusively in church buildings because only there does it have
divine presence—not in clubs, halls, or otherwise equipped rooms. The words of
Jesus Christ, “For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in
the midst of them,” is interpreted as those who do not have the opportunity to
exchange a simple meeting of the faithful for the fullness of the Church (Matthew
18:20). This quote says nothing about such a gathering of believers outside the church
building qualifying as a church.
The Orthodox Church publicly claims “a respectful attitude towards
representatives” of all religions, even pagans, as long as they live conscientiously and
peacefully. Yet the hierarchy’s councils or its spokespeople define ‘missionary
activity’ as a means of destroying the people’s morals and national traditions, and as a
threat to the spiritual health of citizens and to the country’s very existence. The head
of the Kyivan Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, (UOC-KP), Filaret,
believes that missionary activity will lead even to changes in the spiritual gene pool in
Ukraine. Relying on this, he argues that it is essential that the state ban missionary
activity. “The soul of our people is Orthodoxy,” he emphasizes. “If this soul ceases to
exist, so too will Ukraine.”3

3
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In their appeals to Parliament and the President, the leadership of various
Orthodox churches raises the issue of sealing off access to radio, television, stadiums,
palaces of culture, and clubs for foreign missionaries. Their current access to these
media is criticized as the “sale for dollars” of the nation’s sanctity and a depreciation
of national spiritual treasures. Orthodox churches suspect the charitable work and
humanitarian aid undertaken by various missions as a means to “trap souls.” We note,
however, that the Orthodox Churches are not rushing to undertake this work
themselves. Instead, they cherish the hope that neophytes will convert to Orthodoxy
simply by acknowledging this faith to be the traditional one.
Guided by the principle that ‘truth’ is inexorable and imperturbable, and thus
does not tolerate compromises, Orthodox authors regard missionary activity as ‘false
witness,’ which excludes the possibility of tolerance towards it. They refute
arguments that missionaries are engaged in the ‘holy work’ of sharing the Gospel
among the people by judging that “only the true Church has the exclusive right to
interpret Biblical texts inasmuch as only the Church has a command of Bible
language.”
Orthodox publications represent foreign religious missions as transferring
Western native competitive struggles of various Christian faiths onto Ukrainian soil.
They claim that missionaries and preachers bear not the true word of God, but their
personal interpretation of it. That which Billy Graham professes differs from that
which Mark Finley or John Carter asserts. Missionary interpretations of the Bible are
accused of a subtext promoting the ‘American Dream’ and the spirit of selfish gain
and business, which is far from the ancient Eastern tradition and which is historically
and spiritually invalid.
Orthodox publications argue for a definite distancing from missionary
influences, and warn the reader to “beware, lest others deceive you.” Jesus said there
would be “many of these” (Matthew 24:4). They point to Biblical passages such as
“be not carried about with divers and strange doctrines” (Hebrews 13:9) and “be ye
not unequally yoked together with unbelievers” (2 Corinthians 6:14).
Orthodox theorists attribute the success of foreign Christian missions to a
range of factors: (1) an explosion of the sins of humanity given Ukraine’s new social

conditions, and “where there is sin, there is fertile soil for the devil;” (2) a spiritual
hunger among people in times of materialism that makes them ready to swallow
“life-giving juice and deadly poison” together in the form of churches that are bad
and cannot bring salvation; (3) the fundamental Christian illiteracy of believers which
makes them susceptible to false witness and even erroneous interpretations of ‘Holy
Scripture’ by missionaries; (4) a popular ignorance of the real meaning of spirituality
which allows them to adopt a religion that is “pleasant on the outside, but venomous
at the core;” (5) a casual attitude towards holy teaching, which, through pride and
self-assurance, manifest themselves by a disregard for traditional faith. Instead,
individuals yearn to become wise by reasoning out their own understanding of the
creeds of various faiths.
Theorists conclude that is it better to be completely without faith then to
“subscribe to false reasoning which can deprive one not only of a future life in
eternity but also current earthly life.” Additionally, they advise that, before choosing
a faith, one must certainly counsel with an educated Orthodox priest to learn about
the purpose of the religion of the holy fathers.
Recent efforts by the state, and even some priests and laity to create more
favorable conditions for missionary activity, have provoked severe criticism for
“opening its borders to them.” “If people go to the false prophets,” warns Archbishop
Ihor Issichenko of the Autocephalous Church, “then that indicates that we did not
teach them in time, did not quench their spiritual thirst, and did not give them the
chance to meet the Living God in the holy Temple.” The Moscow Patriarchate takes a
somewhat different swipe at followers of new religions. Typically, it is a forceful
blow announcing new religions as incompatible with Christianity. A decision that is
binding upon members of its Ukrainian Orthodox branch, the Holy Synod of the
Russian Orthodox Church declared “individuals who accept the teachings of these
sects and movements or, moreover, facilitate their propagation, have already
excommunicated themselves from the Orthodox Church.” Guided by this Council’s
statement “On the Attitude of the ROC towards Intra-Christian Cooperation in Search
of Unity,” the leadership of the UOC declared the proselytizing activity of foreign

missionaries to be among believers a form of corruption “of the very idea of
ecumenical cooperation and complementary testimony.”
The Orthodox youth movement displays greater aggressiveness towards neoreligious movements. This aggression has more of a religious-political flavor than a
religious-missionary one. Young Orthodox leaders attack the state because its laws do
not halt the ‘unrighteous activity of sects.’ They take offense that neo-religious
preachers receive facilities such as palaces of culture and clubs to conduct events and
public sermons, and that their literature gets disseminated, and that these preachers
receive invitations to lecture in schools, etc.
To counteract missionary activity, Orthodox priests and hierarchs assert in
their sermons that “the devil himself” is incarnated in the person of a missionary, in a
form “adapted to humanity’s contemporary condition and level of spiritual and
intellectual development.” Coming to humanity in the image of an ‘angel of light,’
extraterrestrial teacher, and mentor, the missionary imparts ‘wisdom’ that in the end
leads “a person to commune with Satan.” Patriarch Filaret compares the belief of a
person of any faith other than Orthodoxy to atheism. “The devil continues to tempt
people to separate them from God and from genuine spiritual life,” he claims.
“Recently it has become unfashionable to contradict God. Therefore, other creeds—false, though externally respectable—have inter-twined themselves with true faith in
God.”4
Historical Orthodoxy no longer relies on its own resilience to counteract the
spread throughout the country of other denominations. It strives to secure, above all,
the support of the state. However, the leadership structure of various Orthodox
churches, in their appeals to the state, typically ask for protection as though it is not
for their own benefit. They submit that the spread of other faiths mortally threatens
the nation’s spiritual heritage, a heritage molded by centuries and dominated by
Orthodox tradition. Alluding to alleged external indicators, Orthodox ideologues
often vociferously assert the absolute and exclusive role of their faith for the spiritual
development of the Ukrainian people. They underscore that Orthodoxy has stood the

4
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test of time and that it will lead to nothing unpleasant or unpredictable. The untested
and unknown faiths could lead to just such an undesirable result.

The Revisionist History of Ukrainian Orthodoxy
However, this argument does not take into account the revisionist history of
Ukrainian Orthodoxy itself. During its autonomous existence within the framework of
the Constantinople Patriarchate (988-1686), it truly matured as a component of
national culture. Its specific traits included sophistication, evangelism, openness,
manners, democracy, and government by council. On the strength of its
achievements, it became its own Ukrainian Christian rite. It differed qualitatively
from the Byzantine and Russian rites in its praise of humanity, its elevation of earth to
heaven, and its high level of aesthetics.
But with the incorporation of the Kyiv archdiocese into the Moscow
Patriarchy in 1686, the latter exerted tremendous effort to liquidate all that made
Orthodoxy in Ukraine a truly national achievement. In time, Orthodoxy in Ukraine
degenerated into an agent of national dissipation and a means of colonization. The use
of Church-Slavonic language, (with Russian accent), for church services facilitated
the displacement of Ukrainian as a common language. It fostered the attitude that
Ukrainian was a not a valuable or viable language, and unsuited for educated spheres.
Moreover, the Moscow church sought to deprive Ukrainians from their own
Christian tradition. It appropriated this tradition—including the Apostle Andrew’s
mission to Ukraine and the baptism of Ukraine-Rus by Prince Volodimir—as merely
a component of the greater history of Great Russia and regarded Ukraine as its
territorial frontier.
Fulfilling its assignment by the Stalinist regime to oppress national Orthodox
churches (especially in Ukraine and Estonia), and become faithfully subservient to
totalitarianism for six decades, the Moscow Patriarchate today strives to be the
dominant spiritual force in the independent states which emerged from the ruins of
the Soviet Union. In our time, this church is the single Union-wide organization,
which, acting legally in these countries, concentrates all its efforts on the regeneration

of the former USSR in modified form. This purpose drives its missionary activity,
which is often hardly religious, in Ukraine.
Therefore, when the UOC-MP so widespread in Ukraine seeks to defend itself
against foreign missionary activity with its urgent declarations about ‘protecting
tradition,’ what really is at issue is the defense of tradition formed by Russian
Orthodoxy. Thus, this tradition is as much an import as the various foreign missions
that seek to convert Ukrainians today.
For this reason, when considering the issue of Ukraine’s own religious
tradition, one should, above all, take into account the following: traditional national
churches in Ukraine are those which have become inalienable components of the
culture. Having deep historical roots, these churches, in their worldviews and moral
institutions and ritual practices, have become enmeshed in the culture of their
believers. This is why protection of their cultural fields of influence from any
missionary inroads forms an aspect of national rebirth. Ukrainian Orthodoxy, in
contrast to Russian, was open and tolerant towards various positive elements in the
activity of other faiths. Examples include its attitude towards the spread of various
Protestant movements in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the unimpeded
settlement of refugees of other faiths from Russia or Poland, especially Old Believers,
Molokany, and Anti-Trinitarians. When an occasional hierarchy of Ukrainian
Orthodoxy declares his aversion to foreign missions, this is more the result of training
by Moscow than of the Ukrainian mentality.

Dealing With Today’s Realities
Orthodox churches in Ukraine must deal with today’s realities. They must
learn to live in conditions of freedom and not expect that their tradition or state
support will rescue them. Their church buildings are open for visits by their members.
The fact that they do not attract neophytes and that their church services are
frequently sparsely attended by parishioners should concern Orthodox churches and
cause them to ask why.
Today, members and potential followers of Orthodoxy are educated
individuals. They are no longer drawn by the pomp of ritual or literal interpretations

of Biblical texts. In church, they want to learn about religion and not merely watch
the performance of dead rituals. It seems that the church has little to say to the current
generation. It stands on its orthodoxy and lives in the past.
The revitalization of religious consciousness and modern religious revival do
not connote a return to the traditional Christianity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. We
observe that the rift between traditional Christianity and the contemporary religious
movement has not narrowed during our present national revival. On the contrary, this
gap continues to widen. Contemporary religious thought is not leaning towards any
one Christian church, but instead seeks to create (and perhaps on the basis of
Christianity) a new religion. This new religion does not lose its specific religious
traits and, at the same time, strives to harmonize with the worldview that proceeds
from the entire content of contemporary culture.
An individual in our time achieves faith in the divine nature of her own being
which is a created soul that is a part of God. Thus she sees salvation in her own
hands, in the divine and spiritual properties of her own self. For this kind of believer,
Jesus Christ stands less as a ‘Savior’ or a mediator with God but foremost as a moral
paragon on the path to becoming one with Him. We observe that traditional Christian
churches of Ukraine are unprepared to teach such believers. Foreign religious
missionaries have capitalized on this unreadiness.

Active Missionary Work of Greek-Catholic and Roman-Catholic Churches
If Ukraine’s orthodox churches are practically excluded from missionary
activity, then both the Greek-Catholic and Roman-Catholic Churches are actively
conducting it. Greek-Catholics have squeezed out the Orthodox from three Galician
oblasts (Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk) by taking over their churches. These
buildings belonged to them until the so-called Lviv Church Council in 1946 that
forcibly incorporated the Greek-Catholic Church into the Moscow Patriarchate.
Evidence of Greek-Catholic growth includes an increase in the number of
congregations from 2,643 in 1991 to 3,175 in 1997 and a construction program that
consists of almost a thousand new churches and chapels. They are renovating those

church buildings that were utilized for other than religious purposes during the Soviet
period.
Simultaneously, Greek-Catholicism claims status not as a regional but as a
nation-wide church and insists on spiritually ministering to its followers throughout
Ukraine. It seeks to open parishes in eastern oblasts, especially in the areas densely
populated by emigrants from Galicia. The church does not consider this as
‘proselytizing in the East.’ “We would not intrude there if our people were not there,”
claims Lyubomir Huzar, current de facto head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic
Church (UGCC).5 The church leadership created and heavily supports the
Kyiv-Vishhorodsky exarchate that organizationally unites the eastern Greek-Catholic
parishes. To realize the idea of transferring its center to Kyiv, the church has begun
construction of a patriarchal cathedral. Members of the monastic order of St. Basil’s
are conducting catechisms in the cities of eastern Ukraine.
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In actively pursuing its ‘Eastern policy,’ the Church’s leadership couches this
work in certain cautious terms to disarm the Orthodox. Typical assurances include:
“We do not wish to capitalize on Orthodoxy’s temporary weakness.” “It would be
wrong to create a division from the Catholics.” “There are Catholics, there are
Greek-Catholics, and there are Orthodox. It should not be so. Christians should not
live divided.”
While the nationally oriented Orthodox churches accept the mobilization of
Greek-Catholicism with some degree of calm, the UOC-MP emphatically expresses
its dissatisfaction. On the one hand, it continues its policy of non-recognition of
Greek-Catholicism as an independent Christian faith. On the other hand, it perceives
its successes as signs of Catholicism’s general expansion eastward onto Orthodoxy’s
self-proclaimed canonical territory.
Though performing active missionary work in various regions of the country,
Greek Catholics manifest their disapproval that, as they write, “Ukraine has become a
kind of ‘wide-open field’ for numerous false, homegrown prophets and preachers
from different Western sects and foreign religions. The essence of the latter is
unacceptable to the spirit of the Ukrainian people.”6 The Greek-Catholic church
believes that the proselytizing of foreign missions will lead to the ruin of religious
and cultural life for the still unconsolidated Ukrainian nation. It considers itself,
together with the Orthodox churches (but not the state, as the latter wants), as
responsible for investing maximum effort towards securing spiritual protection for all
citizens of the country. It thinks this alliance should conduct an educational campaign
among the public about the harm and immorality of the teachings and influences of
certain sects. With a view to executing such a program, the Church arranged for the
preparation of a thousand such catechism teachers.
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The activity of Polish Catholic priest-missionaries and monks that spread the
Latin rite on Ukrainian soil elicits particular alarm in Greek-Catholic lay
organizations (whose alarm is silently shared by the official church institutions). They
exhort the Polish Roman-Catholic hierarchy to “minister among the Ukrainian
population in the Eastern Byzantine-Ukrainian rite” and to subordinate their
missionaries “to the jurisdiction of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic
Church.”7
In fact, Ukraine in the last decade has indeed become a field of active
missionary activity for Roman-Catholics, who are usually expatriates from Poland.
They see the goal of their mission to “evangelize and plant the Church among those
nations or groups where it has yet to put down roots.” To avoid accusations of
proselytizing, Roman-Catholics ‘ground’ their right to expand the network of
Catholic institutions in Ukraine in the assertion that it has not regained its pre-Soviet
status, in terms of the number of monasteries and churches, for example. This flatly
ignores the country’s new realities, such as its insignificant quantity of
Roman-Catholic followers and the revitalization process of its traditional national
churches. The result is that Catholic monasteries settle citizens of other countries in
Ukraine and foreign priests perform liturgies in half-empty churches. All this
provokes

open

condemnation

from

Greek-Catholic

lay

and

ecclesiastical

functionaries.
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Having become the dominant faith in the Galician region of Ukraine, GreekCatholicism has also erected a protective barricade against the penetration of various
foreign religious missions. The theoretical basis for this barricade is the evaluation of
Greek-Catholicism as national tradition, to which alone the Ukrainian ethnos owes its
survival and potential for self-preservation. “A great struggle is underway, sects
multiply rapidly and stir up trouble among the people, and the people treat lightly
their traditional religion, their faith, for which our forefathers suffered so much.”
These words of Bishop Sophran the Wise reflect Greek-Catholicism’s attitude
towards missionary activity. It is typical that the bishop transfers the blame for the
spread of this so-called “religious cacophony and anarchy” onto the faithful
themselves. They are blamed because they do not practice their faith and do not go
bravely among the people to give “an example of righteous living” and to rebut the
“false witness of the missionaries.”8 The Greek-Catholic Church explains the youth’s
devotion to other faiths as a result of the clergy’s incapacity to satisfy the inquiries of
the young generation, to match its level of education, or to share its understanding of
‘how to be a Christian.’

Roman Catholic Mission Policy
The Apostolic capital9 organizes its missionary policy regarding Ukraine
according to the Decree’s article concerning this activity as adopted by the Second
Vatican Council. Pertinent is the statement that “God desires all people to be saved
and come to a knowledge of the truth,” that “the entire human family join into one
people of God and come together in the one body of Christ.” Given that two billion
people allegedly have not as yet heard the Gospel news, the Catholic Church views
the ‘preaching of the Gospel’ as the principal means to realize God’s appointed
purpose.10
In the Decree “On Missionary Activity of the Church,” the leadership of the
Roman Catholic Church lays out the theological grounds for its missionary
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dissemination in Ukraine. First, God wishes to invite each person to participate in His
life and salvation, gathering His dispersed children into one. Second, the Apostles
themselves exhorted the faithful of Christ’s Church to persist in their task, so that “the
word of the Lord may have free course, and be glorified” (2 Thessalonians 3:1).
Considering the diversity of the subjects of its influence, Roman-Catholics
delineate three forms of missionary activity (1) work among pagans, which envelops
all non-Christians, (2) work among their own believers, and (3) work among other
Christians in order to renew their unity. In contrast to traditional churches, the
Roman-Catholic Church does not suffer from a shortage of priests and material
resources. The Church calls for peaceful receptivity towards its missionary activity
“based on a common consciousness of faith in Jesus Christ” and its search for
complementary efforts and cooperation in the social, technical, and cultural spheres.
This simply masks the Roman-Catholic Church’s desire to establish itself on
Ukrainian soil.
Other evidence for this concealed desire is the Vatican’s mission program,
entitled Pontifica Commisione per la Russia (“Pro Russia” for short) for the New
Independent States. That this program treats the independent state of Ukraine as a part
of the Russian empire deserves attention. Thus the Vatican hopes to ‘harmonize’ its
activity in Ukraine with the Church of the Moscow Patriarchy.
The publication of a document in June 1992, entitled “General Principles and
Practical Norms for Coordination of the Action of the Catholic Church in Russia and
other Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States,” testifies to a definite
understanding between the Moscow Patriarchy and the Roman leadership concerning
their respective spheres of influence and ‘missionary action’ in Ukraine.
Well-educated Polish missionaries of the Latin rite, disguised as ‘protectors,’ arrive
today in Ukraine with the objective of organizing various schools and groups
auxiliary to the churches. Ukrainian children are carted off to summer camps in
Poland, were they experience a significant influence of catechism.
The Second Vatican Council’s decree on missionary activity exudes
magnanimity and good intentions. However, the Catholic Church is not observing all
of its provisions on the territory of Ukraine. Noting the local Christian churches’

deficit of priests and resources, the document acknowledges that the Catholic Church
should provide them with assistance that would serve their development and ripening
Christian life. In fact, we see not assistance but exploitation of these difficulties,
aimed at rooting Catholicism in Ukraine. The document also puts forth the necessity
of adapting missionary work to the customs of the people and the variable
circumstances of their lives. Here also the Catholic Church blatantly operates outside
the course of Ukrainian national tradition. As a group of well-known activists in
culture and science noted in an open letter to the president of Ukraine,11 the Roman
Catholic Church pursues a course of Policization with its missionary activity,
motivated by the Ukraino-phobic position of Polish chauvinists. The Church further
fails to carry out the Decree’s provision for dialogue with non-Christian religions and
cultures. Moreover, Catholics do not even have any contacts with Protestant
denominations.
The Vatican authors of the macro-policy fail to see developing problems and
situations in Ukraine. In seeking to resolve—with the Moscow patriarch—the
problems of Ukrainian religious life, the Apostolic capital disregards the presence of
nationally oriented Orthodox churches in Ukraine and does not communicate with
them. The joint condemnation of Ukrainian ‘nationalism’ by the Moscow patriarch
and the Vatican shows the Vatican’s blind spot to the obvious and undeniable
imperialism of the Russian Church. The latter, alluding to its declared partnership
with the Roman-Catholic Church, petitions Pope John Paul II through its Bishop
Augustine in Lviv to “abolish the Unions of Brest and Uzhorod, which stand as an
artificial wall between us.”12
Only the imperial church of Russia, which perceives Ukraine to be an
appendage of the Russian state, could display similar impudence regarding one of the
traditional Ukrainian churches—the Greek-Catholic.
The Catholic Church officially declares its recognition of truth and holiness in
other religions and its lack of hostility towards them. In contrast to the Orthodox and
Greek Catholics, it does not hope for state restrictions on the missionary activity of
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new religious movements. Such restrictions would place weights on its own plans to
expand and evangelize. Sensing its missionary strength and possessing the proper
material resources for it, the Church does not fear contact with other Christians and
cooperates with them in the work of “spreading the Gospel news.” Along with this, it
cherishes the hope that ecumenical cooperation will, in time, transform into a
unification of denominations on the basis of Catholicism and will catalyze the “return
to the original, undivided church.”
We note, however, that Catholic publications in Ukraine sound warnings to its
faithful regarding the missionaries of other faiths, which “are not written in the law,
including God’s laws.” They recall the warning of Jesus Christ about false prophets,
“which come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves”
(Matthew 7:15).
Ukrainian Protestant Attitudes to Missions
In contrast to the Orthodox, the Greek-Catholic and Roman-Catholic churches
generally receive positive marks and support for the activities of their foreign
missions from Ukraine’s traditional Protestant churches, namely the Evangelical
Christian-Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, and Christians of Evangelical Faith. In
his addresses at scholarly conferences, one leader of Ukrainian Adventism, M.
Zhykalyuk, advances the notion that missionary activity is “the right to one’s own
point of view.” Any restrictions imposed by legislation to protect Orthodoxy would
demonstrate that Ukraine is not a state governed by laws. The leader of the Ukrainian
Church of Christians of Evangelic Faith (Pentecostals), M. Melnyk, calls for the state
to revamp its negative view regarding religious missions, and, at the same time, he
extends a proposition to all Christian faiths to create a single program of missionary
activity to evangelize Ukraine.
With a certain level of support from their foreign headquarters [sic], Ukraine’s
traditional Protestant churches have rolled out widespread evangelical activity. It
takes familiar forms: propagation of the Word of God through oral preaching,
customized printed (materials published and paid for by these churches), radio and
television throughout Ukraine, and charitable work, such as visiting those who live
alone or who are in pain or in prison, etc.

Orthodoxy and Catholicism, on one hand, and Protestantism, on the other,
have different attitudes towards proselytizing. The latter finds it perfectly legal, but
the former attach an ostensibly negative connotation to this concept. The former
strives in every way to restrict the proselytizing by ‘outsiders.’ Yet they themselves
quietly eye Protestants as a target of their own proselytizing.

Conclusions
We have elucidated the nature of the attitudes towards religious missionary
activity of both Ukrainian traditional churches and the churches traditional for
Ukraine. This discussion leads to the following conclusions:
(1) By itself, the religious factor in Ukraine has never been decisive in the processes
of ethnic creation and ethnic development or of national renaissance. The national
idea always took priority. This convergence on the primacy of the national idea
causes us to view denominational differences as incapable of playing a crucial or
retarding role in the society’s development or the nation’s revival. Thus the state
should control the religious process only to the extent delineated in the pertinent
international and Ukrainian legal documents. In this way every individual is
guaranteed denominational independence. This freedom includes not only the right to
obtain the necessary information about a given faith and the right to accept it as the
creed of one’s own choosing and worldview, but also the right to spread one’s faith
irrespective of political borders.
(2) The traditional absence of creedal fanaticism among Ukrainians guarantees their
tolerant and, to a certain extent, curious attitude towards new religious movements.
Hostility towards new religions and the desire to place one’s own denomination under
the aegis of the state is perpetrated foremost by those circles of Church leadership
who wish to justify their own missionary inertia or to gain political capital among
those political forces which stand for national independence.
(3) Considering that traditional national churches (a) were officially forbidden by the
state during the years of totalitarian rule, (b) lack material resources that in turn
hampers the operation and organization of religious life in full measure, and (c) must
now compete with Western missionary centers, the state should be a catalyst for their

activity. This facilitation can include tax breaks, assistance with the construction and
repair of church buildings, aid in their publishing programs, and access to mass
media.
(4) National tradition is not merely the repetition of that which has happened before
but also progress on the basis of the past. It is appropriate not only to revive tradition
but also to continue it in order to maintain its contemporary nature and applicability
to life. Ukrainian traditional churches will preserve their viability on the condition
that they include in their functional context that which is positive from the
evangelical processes carried out by foreign religious missionary activity. The church
should view its faithful not merely as the object of its influence during the liturgy, but
also as the subject of its denomination’s focus, that is, the church is comprised of the
laity as well as the clergy.
(5) The fact that foreign missions bring the Word of God to Ukraine at a time when it
lacks its own such opportunities by its traditional faiths and churches deserves
mention. Those missionaries who arrive in Ukraine do not always take into account
the thousand-year Christian tradition on Ukrainian lands. Sharing words of morality
and goodness with the public, they sometimes fail to consider the national concerns of
Ukrainians.
(6) The activity of Christian missionaries of various faiths need not focus on the
creation of their own organizational structures in Ukraine. This activity would have
greater impact if entered into the context of the evangelical efforts of traditional faiths
and aided them in catechism work, and preparation of cadres of missionaries. This
would facilitate the spiritual consolidation of our society, and contribute to the
establishment of Ukraine as a sovereign state.
(7) In organizing missionary activity in Ukraine, foreign religious centers would be
well advised to keep in mind the national, family, and common traditions of
Ukrainians and to catalyze the process of national state-building. In this process, the
language used by missionaries is crucial. A missionary who evangelizes in Russian
allies himself with those Ukraino-phobic forces which retard in every possible way
the process of Ukraine’s national state-building and renaissance.

